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The Split on the Rogers v. Grimaldi 
Gridiron: An Analysis of Unauthorized 
Trademark Use in Artistic Mediums 
Anthony Zangrillo* 
Movies, television programs, and video games often exploit trade-
marks within their content. In particular, various media often attempt 
to use the logos of professional sports teams within artistic works. Courts 
have utilized different methods to balance the constitutional protections 
of the First Amendment with the property interests granted to the owner 
of a trademark. This Note discusses these methods, which include the 
alternative avenues approach, the likelihood of confusion test, and the 
right of publicity analysis. Ultimately, many courts utilize the frame-
work presented in the seminal Rogers v. Grimaldi decision. This test 
analyzes the artistic relevance of the trademark’s use in the allegedly 
infringing work, while also protecting against explicitly misleading uses. 
Currently, federal circuits apply the Rogers test inconsistently, particu-
larly in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. This Note calls 
for a consistent method to harmonize First Amendment protections with 
trademark property interests through the Rogers test. This Note propos-
es that the threshold for First Amendment protections should remain 
relatively low for culturally relevant marks. This Note also argues that 
courts should analyze a First Amendment defense before engaging in a 
likelihood of confusion inquiry. This Note’s suggested approach would 
implement important safeguards to avoid lengthy trademark litigation, 
and thus, incentivize more artistic works by lowering transaction costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consistently, various films, television programs, and video 
games utilize the trademarks owned by professional sports teams. 
Every artistic depiction of a sporting event consists of some generic 
elements: The roaring fans aggressively cheering for their favorite 
team; the colossal stadium housing a conflict fit for gladiators; the 
aggressive competitors hoping to secure a victory for their team. 
Yet, every artist must make a costly decision to elevate or diminish 
the realism in his or her expression. Should the media utilize the 
names and symbols of real, professional teams, or avoid a possible 
conflict by generating fictitious teams unique to the artistic expres-
sion? 
Undoubtedly, this conflict embodies the uneasy balance cur-
rently maintained between First Amendment protections for artists 
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and the property interest granted to trademarks.1 For example, the 
National Football League (“NFL”) openly negotiates licensing 
agreements with a multitude of filmmakers, but artists attempting 
to transcend their work in cultural critiques often find significant 
resistance from the NFL brass.2 Heaven Can Wait, Ace Ventura: Pet 
Detective, and Jerry Maguire portrayed the NFL in a positive light 
and accordingly received permission to use “highly visible NFL 
trademarks.”3 On the other hand, The Replacements, Buffalo ‘66, 
and Any Given Sunday criticized certain aspects of the NFL, result-
ing in negative depictions of the league.4 As a result, these films did 
not receive permission to use NFL trademarks, forcing the films to 
use imaginary teams.5 For example, Oliver Stone’s Any Given Sun-
day tackled bigger social issues, including “nudity, graphic vi-
olence, drug use, domestic abuse, intra-team fights and players as-
saulting referees.”6 Stone remarked that the NFL “got very sensi-
tive about [some of the movie’s] issue[s], especially domestic abuse 
situations.”7 To avoid restrictive NFL censors and a potential law-
suit, the film utilized a fictitious NFL team.8 
However, according to legal precedent, Stone did not have to 
use a fictitious team. Even though the Lanham Act provides certain 
protections for trademark owners, this property interest cannot 
outweigh the constitutional protections of free expression granted 
by the First Amendment: Stone’s film would qualify as a valid work 
of artistic expression.9 In most circuits, the NFL’s claim would be 
                                                                                                                            
1 See discussion infra Section I.B. 
2 See David Albert Pierce, Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: Making Money & 
Avoiding Lawsuits, MOVIEMAKER, no. 63, 2006, at 74, 74. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Wesley Ryan Shelley, The Big Picture: Balancing Artists’ First Amendment Rights with 
the Trademark Interests of Sports Teams in the Wake of the University of Alabama v. Daniel 
Moore, 2 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 43, 59 n.90 (2012). 
7 Anthony Lappi, Any Given (Super Bowl) Sunday, SALON (Jan. 29, 2000, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2000/01/29/stone_5/ [http://perma.cc/G8Z3-LDK4]. 
8 See Oliver Herzfeld & Tal Benschar, HBO’s Ballers: Touchdown or Legal Fumble?, 
FORBES (June 27, 2015, 9:56 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2015/ 
06/17/hbos-ballers-touchdown-or-legal-fumble/#3011c3aa5d84 [https://perma.cc/ 
T8M5-8VN7]. 
9 See infra Section I.B. 
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dismissed under a First Amendment defense.10 However, current 
inconsistencies between the circuits provide a risk of potentially 
costly and onerous litigation.11 In effect, filmmakers and other art-
ists cower at the bullying threats of monopolistic mark holders.12 
This chilling effect robs the public of meaningful, critical works 
in exchange for extended commercials disguised as movies.13 For 
example, Sony almost “pulled the plug” on Moneyball because Ma-
jor League Baseball (“MLB”) remained unhappy over some “fac-
tual liberties” in the initial script, which adapted the nonfiction 
story of Billy Beane, Oakland Athletics’ general manager.14 Even-
tually, Sony relented and chose to fire famed screenwriter Steven 
Soderbergh, picking up an MLB endorsement in the process.15 
While the MLB-influenced final product was a box office success 
and critical darling, questions surrounding the initial vision should 
trouble aspiring directors.16 In effect, the sports league exercised 
crippling control over the studio in the shadow of the law.17 This 
example showcases the power of marketing juggernauts with a 
cache of protected trademarks. 
Sony once again shrunk in the face of conflict, according to 
emails released in the infamous hack of Sony’s servers.18 Allegedly, 
Sony removed negative depictions of the NFL in the biographical 
                                                                                                                            
10 See infra notes 305–10 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 306–15 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 316–20 and accompanying text. 
13 See Abe Sauer, At the Movies: Adam Sandler Builds a Product Placement Joke with 
“Jack and Jill,” BRANDCHANNEL (Nov. 11, 2011), http://brandchannel.com/2011/11/11/ 
at-the-movies-adam-sandler-builds-a-product-placement-joke-with-jack-and-jill/ [http:// 
perma.cc/3L7M-YLY9]. 
14 Michael Cieply, Money Worries Kill A-List Film at Last Minute, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/business/media/02moneyball.html 
[http://perma.cc/6RJ6-XK4N]. 
15 Id. 
16 See Lucas Shaw & Todd Cunningham, Why Sports Movies Like ‘Million Dollar Arm,’ 
‘Draft Day’ Have Become Their Own Underdog Stories, WRAP (Apr. 14, 2014, 1:51 PM), 
http://www.thewrap.com/draft-day-million-dollar-arm-sports-movies-underdog [http:// 
perma.cc/3H9F-UVU6]. 
17 Cieply, supra note 14. 
18 See Ken Belson, Sony Altered ‘Concussion’ Film to Prevent N.F.L. Protests, Emails 
Show, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/sports/ 
football/makers-of-sonys-concussion-film-tried-to-avoid-angering-nfl-emails-show.html 
[http://perma.cc/RD6C-3SN3]. 
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sports drama Concussion.19 The film follows the NFL’s attempts to 
suppress a forensic pathologist’s research on chronic traumatic en-
cephalopathy, a degenerative brain disease that affects professional 
football players.20 The NFL obviously had a significant interest in 
this film’s content, which influenced Sony to collaborate with an 
outside consultant hired by the NFL in order to ensure the movie 
conveyed a “whistle-blower story, rather than a condemnation of 
football or the league.”21 Sony maintained independence from the 
NFL’s interests, merely reaching out to the league in order to ac-
curately portray the controversial story.22 Still, the studio’s true 
intent in making these changes remains a mystery.23 Sony’s claims 
of collaboration conflict with the NFL’s previous actions concern-
ing the controversial topic of head trauma.24 Interestingly, the 
film’s marketing campaign prominently touted the NFL mark, as 
well as the marks of the league’s various teams.25 It is unclear if 
Sony received the NFL’s blessing, as neither side has commented 
on this question.26  However, rather than enjoying Moneyball’s suc-
cess, Concussion opened to a “disastrous” box office and tepid re-
views.27 
A striking light in the fog of unauthorized trademarks is HBO’s 
new comedy Ballers.28 The popular show features Dwayne “The 
Rock” Johnson as a former player turned financial advisor.29 While 
HBO did not utilize NFL marks in the marketing of the show, the 
initial episode showcased an array of protected marks—most noti-
                                                                                                                            
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. The NFL confronted ESPN in 2004, regarding a fictional television series 
involving a negative depiction of NFL players, as well as in 2013, concerning a 
documentary analyzing the “dangers of head trauma.” Id. Disney, ESPN’s parent 
company, cancelled the series after one season, but the documentary later aired on PBS. 
Id. 
25 CONCUSSION (Columbia Pictures 2015). 
26 Belson, supra note 18. 
27 Daniel J. Flynn, ‘Concussion’ Bombs at Box Office, BREITBART (Dec. 28, 2015), 
http://www.breitbart.com/big-hollywood/2015/12/28/concussion-bombs-at-box-office/ 
[http://perma.cc/3ZH3-HVPG]. 
28 Ballers (HBO television broadcast 2015). 
29 Id. 
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ceably the Miami Dolphins logo and uniforms.30 In response to 
cries of infringement by the NFL and media pundits, HBO main-
tained that “in this context[,] there is no legal requirement to ob-
tain [the NFL’s] consent.”31 While the NFL has not threatened a 
lawsuit, HBO’s current position seems valid because the logos cha-
racterize the background of an expressive work, merely propelling 
the artistic work forward.32 Still, future seasons may shy away from 
exploring controversial issues out of a fear that a certain depiction 
of the NFL or its officials is misleading to the public.33 
This Note aims to reinforce HBO’s position by calling for a 
uniform approach to balancing the First Amendment against 
trademark appropriation. Part I provides a background on trade-
mark law, focusing on the methods various circuits utilize to grant 
First Amendment protections to artists using trademarks in their 
works. Part I also discusses the alternative avenues approach, the 
likelihood of confusion test, and the right of publicity analysis. Part 
II discusses the circuit split in applying the Rogers v. Grimaldi 
framework, which most courts have adopted.34 Part III calls for all 
courts to consistently apply this test in order to reduce uncertainty 
in the courtroom and argues that the threshold for First Amend-
ment protections should remain relatively low for culturally rele-
vant marks. Part III also argues that courts should revise how the 
analysis proceeds in these conflicts by analyzing a First Amend-
ment defense before engaging in a likelihood of confusion inquiry. 
                                                                                                                            
30 Jason Guerrasio, Here’s Why the Rock’s New HBO Show, ‘Ballers,’ Can Legally Use 
NFL Logos Without the League’s Consent, BUS. INSIDER (June 19, 2015, 11:44 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-rocks-ballers-can-use-nfl-logos-without-
consent-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/65WS-MGH6?type=image]. In one scene, the Green 
Bay Packers logo is prominently displayed in the general manager’s office. See id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Zach Bergson, Time Will Tell How NFL Feels About HBO’s Ballers, FORBES (Aug. 13, 
2015, 2:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/zachbergson/2015/08/13/time-will-tell-
how-nfl-feels-about-hbos-ballers/#77056bf859d9 [http://perma.cc/D9PE-HEQE]. 
34 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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I. HOW TRADEMARKS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
INTERSECT 
A. Summary of Trademark Law 
Trademarks assist consumers by helping them easily identify 
preferred goods or services, while companies can effectively distin-
guish themselves within various markets.35 Companies like the 
NFL register trademarks that can include “any word, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . used . . . to identify 
and distinguish [their] goods . . . from [competitors] and to indicate 
the source of the goods.”36 A person or company acquires a mark 
through use of the mark in commerce.37 Through the Lanham Act, 
federal law provides protection for trademark owners from uses 
that infringe or dilute the strength of the mark.38 Infringement in-
volves an offering for sale or sale of a product by an unauthorized 
user of the registered mark that is likely to cause confusion, mis-
take, or deception.39 Dilution weakens a famous mark’s ability to 
identify and distinguish goods or services in the marketplace.40 
Notably, the narrow definition of infringement requires a sale or 
advertisement to initiate the cause of action;41 however, the Lan-
ham Act provides broader protection through an “unfair competi-
tion” claim that protects even unregistered marks from misleading 
uses that cause confusion in the marketplace.42 
B. Methods to Grant First Amendment Protections 
The need to artistically discuss and present famous marks has 
led courts to develop different schemes to balance the competing 
interests of the artist and mark holder.43 While inconsistencies exist 
between the circuits, modern courts have adopted several “internal 
                                                                                                                            
35 See Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 381 (7th Cir. 2007). 
36 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
37 See id. 
38 See generally id. §§ 1051–1127. 
39 § 1114 (1)(a). 
40 § 1125(c). 
41 § 1114 (1)(a). 
42 See Dell Pub. Co. v. Stanley Publications, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 656, 660 (N.Y. 1961); 
Porter v. LSB Industries, Inc., 192 A.D.2d 205, 211 (N.Y. 1993). 
43 See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the 
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 195–96. 
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mechanisms to address issues of free expression [in trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition claims].”44 This Note recogniz-
es the Rogers test as the most equitable solution, but this Section 
also explores other methods of granting First Amendment protec-
tions in the trademark realm. Some courts have gravitated to an 
alternative avenues approach, analyzing whether there is a way to 
comment on a trademark without infringing on the mark.45 Other 
courts restrict their analysis to likelihood of confusion test alone.46 
Additionally, some courts have adopted the transformative use test 
from right of publicity precedent.47 
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinemas, Ltd., 
the plaintiff sued for trademark infringement when the Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders service mark and uniform were used in a 
sexually explicit film, “Debbie Does Dallas.”48 The defendants 
argued for an extension of the fair use doctrine in copyright law to 
the trademark context.49 However, the Dallas Cowboys court found 
that the fair use doctrine was inapplicable to trademark claims.50 
Conversely, in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., the court 
refused to apply the Lanham Act to noncommercial speech.51 This 
approach has a basis in the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” re-
quirement.52 Yet recent court interpretations of the “use in com-
                                                                                                                            
44 Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property 
and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013). 
45 See infra Section I.B.1. 
46 See infra Section I.B.2. 
47 See infra Section I.B.3. 
48 604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1979). 
49 Id. at 205. “The fair use doctrine allows adjustments of conflicts between the [F]irst 
[A]mendment and the copyright laws, and is designed primarily to balance ‘the exclusive 
rights of a copyright holder with the public’s interest in dissemination of information 
affecting areas of universal concern, such as art, science and industry.’” Id. at 206 
(citations omitted) (quoting Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 
91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
50 Id. (“It is unlikely that the fair use doctrine is applicable to trademark infringements; 
however we need not reach that question.”). 
51 811 F.2d 26, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1987) (“It offends the Constitution, however, to invoke 
the anti-dilution statute as a basis for enjoining the noncommercial use of a trademark by a 
defendant engaged in a protected form of expression . . . .”). 
52 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); see also Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and 
the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 983 
(2007) (“The ‘use in commerce’ requirement consists of two subparts: (1) the defendant 
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merce” standard have rendered its application “beyond recogni-
tion.”53 While commercial speech should do “no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction,” mixed artistic and commercial 
speech reside in a hybrid area of First Amendment protection.54 In 
effect, some courts have found a use in commerce where the plain-
tiff’s sales have been affected or the plaintiff can prove the defen-
dant acted with the intent to injure the plaintiff.55 However, a web-
site that promotes a movie, while expanding upon the cinematically 
created universe, may fall in a protected area of artistic speech.56 
Disregarding the confusion among commercial and noncommercial 
speech, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the 
use in commerce approach inadequate in protecting the “public 
against flagrant deception.”57 Instead, the Second Circuit found it 
necessary for courts to strike a balance between the “public inter-
est in avoiding consumer confusion [and] the public interest in free 
expression.”58 
Parsing the difference between commercial and expressive uses 
becomes quite challenging in practice. Product placement is a 
common occurrence in popular films and television shows, but 
sometimes its inclusion can be vital to plot and characterization. 
For example, the Netflix series Daredevil uses a Fordham Law 
sweatshirt to change audience perceptions of a cynical district at-
torney.59 On the other end of the commercial-expressive spectrum, 
the blockbuster film Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice includes a 
                                                                                                                            
must make a ‘trademark use’ of the plaintiff’s mark, and (2) that use must be in or affect 
‘commerce,’ as defined in Lanham Act section 45.”). 
53 Barrett, supra note 52, at 985–86. 
54 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); see Barrett, supra note 
52, at 987. 
55 Barrett, supra note 52, at 986. 
56 See, e.g., Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 
933–34 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (holding that a movie website was not commercial speech, even 
though it suggested to buy tickets, because the website was really an “extension[] of the 
film”).  The court’s application cuts against a “generous interpretation” of commercial 
use. Bartholomew, supra note 44, at 52 (“Trademark cases rarely involve defendants 
lacking any profit motive whatsoever.”). 
57 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
58 Id. 
59 Daredevil: The Man in the Box (Netflix Mar. 18, 2016). Before this scene, the series 
depicted the district attorney as a power-hungry politician. Id. After the character’s attire 
showcases her vulnerability, she pleads with the protagonists for forgiveness. Id. 
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blatant commercial for Turkish Airlines that does not add any rele-
vant artistic value to the film.60 Oliver Stone’s World Trade Center 
falls somewhere in the middle of the spectrum: Stone’s final cut 
included “the shadow of American Airlines Flight 11 pass[ing] 
across a Zoolander billboard as it plummet[ed] toward the North 
Tower.”61 While Stone considered this a veiled attack at “launch-
ing such a silly movie in the direct wake of an American tragedy,” 
many saw Zoolander’s inclusion as an advertisement because Para-
mount released both movies.62 As these examples suggest, direc-
tors utilize marks for artistic relevance and social messages in un-
clear ways that may not always be apparent to judges. Ambiguous, 
creative expression creates a subjective standard that forces courts 
to weigh the artistic views of the creator, audience, parties to a law-
suit, and even the judges themselves.63 
Some courts have chosen to rely on a descriptive or nominative 
fair use defense in cases in which the unauthorized use has resulted 
in a likelihood of confusion.64 Under descriptive fair use, an artist 
may use a mark in a non-trademark descriptive category.65 To 
avoid a constitutional question, some courts have chosen to drudge 
through the nominative fair use defense.66 Nominative fair use pro-
tects a referential use that strictly identifies a mark owner or an 
                                                                                                                            
60 BATMAN V SUPERMAN: DAWN OF JUSTICE (Warner Bros. Pictures 2016). 
61 David Ehrlich, Derek Zoolander Writes 9/11 History, COLUM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 14, 
2006, at 12. 
62 Id.  Another questionable use of product placement appeared in the Ghostbusters 
reboot. While most audiences will interpret the display of a container of Pringles as 
blatant advertisement, the snack is utilized in a joke that arguably defines Kate 
McKinnon’s quirky scientist character. See GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures 2016). 
63 See infra Section I.B.1–3. 
64 See Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2001); New Kids on the 
Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 1992). 
65 See, e.g., Packman, 267 F.3d at 641 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding a media company’s use of 
“The joy of six” as a headline reprinted on T-shirts did not infringe the trademark 
because it described the Chicago Bulls’ sixth NBA championship); Sunmark, Inc. v. 
Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1057–58 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Ocean 
Spray’s use of “sweet-tart” did not infringe the SweeTARTS trademark because it 
merely described the taste of the defendant’s juice rather than identify the plaintiff’s 
brand). 
66 Bartholomew, supra note 44, at 45 (noting that the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, 
in addition to numerous district courts outside those circuits, have “recognized the 
viability of a nominative fair use defense”). 
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owner’s product or services.67 In these cases, there is “no descrip-
tive substitute . . . [as] many goods and services are effectively 
identifiable only by their trademarks.”68 
1. Alternative Avenues Approach 
The “alternative avenues” approach resolves trademark and 
First Amendment disputes by equating this conflict with a consti-
tutional claim in property law.69 The analysis examines whether 
there are other ways for the defendant to comment on a topic with-
out infringing on the plaintiff’s trademark.70 For example, in Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., a professional 
football team brought trademark infringement, unfair competition, 
and dilution claims against a movie studio.71 The team argued that 
the defendant’s explicit movie harmed the team’s trademark be-
cause the film featured a cheerleader performing sexual actions, 
while “don[ning] a uniform strikingly similar to that worn by the 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders.”72 The district court granted the 
football team a preliminary injunction against the film.73 On appeal, 
the Second Circuit held that there was a high likelihood of confu-
sion due to the disparagement of the brand caused by the “sexually 
                                                                                                                            
67 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307–08 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Much useful social 
and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an 
infringement lawsuit every time they referred to a person, company or product by using 
its trademark.”). The defense requires: “First, the product or service in question must be 
one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the 
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; 
and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.” Id. at 308. 
68 Id. at 306; see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 
(9th Cir. 1969) (holding that using the Volkswagen mark to merely convey information 
would not infringe upon Volkswagen’s trademark). 
69 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (“It would be an unwarranted 
infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First 
Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of 
communication exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without 
significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.”). 
70 Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
71 Id. at 203. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 205. 
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depraved film.”74 When ruling on possible defenses, the court held 
that “[t]rademark is in the nature of a property right and as such it 
need not ‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under 
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communica-
tion exist.’”75 Here, the court decided that there were “numerous 
ways [for the] defendants [to] comment on ‘sexuality in athletics’ 
without infringing plaintiff’s trademark.”76 Therefore, the injunc-
tion did not “encroach upon . . . First Amendment rights.”77 
Following this case, the Eighth Circuit adopted the alternative 
avenues approach in Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak.78 In 
Novak, an insurance company brought a trademark infringement 
and disparagement suit against a designer.79 The district court en-
joined the designer from using the logo or a confusingly similar 
logo on their products.80 On appeal, the Eight Circuit echoed the 
Second Circuit’s analysis, holding that “failure to protect Mutual’s 
trademark rights would amount to an ‘unwarranted infringement 
of property rights,’ for it would “diminish [those] rights without 
significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.”81 In their 
analysis, the court distinguished the facts from the case of an “edi-
torial parody,” which would receive “constitutional protection.”82 
The court further held that a contrary ruling would weaken proper-
ty rights without a corresponding enhancement in free speech.83 
Although the Eighth Circuit has continued to use this ap-
proach,84 most circuits have rejected it, and commentators have 
discredited it.85 In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit distin-
                                                                                                                            
74 Id. at 204–05. 
75 Id. at 206 (citations omitted) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 
(1972)). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987). 
79 Id. at 398. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 402 (quoting Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 567). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); Am. 
Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998). 
85 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (rejecting the alternative avenues approach); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 
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guished a restriction on the “location” of speech from the 
“words” the speaker uses.86 Furthermore, in a footnote, the Rogers 
court remarked that Dallas Cowboys should have been decided un-
der explicitly misleading grounds alone.87 In addition, the dissent in 
Novak provided several compelling public policy arguments for 
avoiding the alternative avenues test’s “significant intrusion upon 
the defendant’s [F]irst [A]mendment rights.”88 The Novak deci-
sion’s extension of liability could stifle creativity, resulting in a 
chilling effect.89 Additionally, the property metaphor “completely 
distorts the analysis” because a trademark is intangible property 
that conveys an idea.90 Thus, the alternative avenues test grants 
trademark holders the ability to control the content of speech 
merely because the artist used the mark.91 In conclusion, the alter-
native avenues approach conflates the distinct real property and 
intellectual property areas of law. 
                                                                                                                            
999 (2d Cir.1989) (rejecting the “no alternative” standard); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1571 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
86 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
87 Id. at 999 n.4 (“Advertisements for the movie were explicitly misleading, stating that 
the principal actress in the movie was a former Dallas Cowboys’ cheerleader.”). 
88 Novak, 836 F.2d at 406 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
89 See Harriet K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and 
Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 964 (1985); see also Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003) (“To suggest that other words can be 
used as well to express an author’s or composer’s message is not a proper test for 
weighing First Amendment rights.”). 
90 Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment 
Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1111–12 (1986) (“Because a parodist expresses ideas 
through the use of another’s trademark, the owner’s attempt to enjoin the parody goes to 
the content of the speech and not merely to the time, place, or manner of its delivery.”); 
see also Parks, 329 F.3d at 450. 
91 Denicola, supra note 43, at 206 (“The issue is not where the defendant may speak, 
but rather what he may say. The [F]irst [A]mendment will not permit the trademark 
owner the power to dictate the form, and thus the effectiveness, of another’s speech 
simply because his trademark has been used to express ideas that he would prefer to 
exclude from the public dialogue.” (emphasis added)). 
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2. Likelihood of Confusion Test 
In other courts, likelihood of confusion concerns trump any no-
tions of First Amendment protections for artists.92 Even courts that 
use the Rogers test have noted that the “likelihood-of-confusion 
test generally strikes a comfortable balance between trademark 
owner’s property rights and the public’s expressive interests.”93 
Upholding the likelihood of confusion approach, Professor Robert 
Denicola argued that the public has a greater interest in restricting 
deceptive or misleading commercial speech in relation to First 
Amendment challenges.94 Additionally, courts were reluctant to 
deviate from the likelihood of confusion analysis in the face of con-
stitutional defenses.95 However, judicial discretion has enabled the 
test to find infringement whenever “the defendant’s use threatens 
to undermine the mark’s distinctiveness or the plaintiff’s business 
good will, despite the lack of any meaningful likelihood that an ap-
preciable number of consumers will be misled.”96 In order to pro-
tect certain expressive works, the court may engage in an ad hoc 
balancing approach without explicitly reaching the First Amend-
ment defenses.97 Scholars suggested this variation “put[s] a dis-
crete judicial finger on the scales in favor of [the] defendant.”98 
Yet, most courts that only use a likelihood of confusion analysis 
will trample a defendant’s right to free expression, improperly pro-
tecting the plaintiff’s property interests.99 For example, in Dr. 
                                                                                                                            
92 See Alex Konzinski, Essay, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 973 
(1993). (“Whatever [F]irst [A]mendment rights you may have in calling the brew you 
make in your bathtub ‘Pepsi’ are easily outweighed by the buyer’s interest in not being 
fooled into buying it.”). 
93 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). 
94 See Denicola, supra note 43, at 165. 
95 Bartholomew, supra note 44, at 42–43; see also David M. Kelly & Lynn M. Jordan, 
Twenty Years of Rogers v. Grimaldi: Balancing the Lanham Act with the First Amendment 
Rights of Creators of Artistic Works, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1360, 1362 (2009). 
96 Barrett, supra note 52, at 985. 
97 Bartholomew, supra note 44, at 43 (“Courts will acknowledge that the defendant is 
using the plaintiff’s mark in a socially valuable, expressive way and then apply that 
understanding to the likelihood of confusion test.”). 
98 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:139 (4th 
ed. 2012); see also Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 
261 (4th Cir. 2007) (adjusting the likelihood of confusion factors for a parody case). 
99 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 
(9th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Dr. Seuss 1997]; Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film 
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Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., Penguin pub-
lished a satirical book about the O.J. Simpson trial that parodied the 
popular Cat in the Hat children’s book.100 While the district court 
recognized a different analysis for First Amendment defenses, the 
Ninth Circuit only applied the likelihood of confusion test on ap-
peal.101 The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, prohibiting 
the publication and distribution of the infringing work.102 Addition-
ally, the Sixth Circuit has criticized the likelihood of confusion and 
alternative avenues approaches for discounting the artistic deci-
sions resulting in a particular form of expression.103 This reliance 
on the likelihood of confusion test significantly harms constitution-
ally protected freedoms by failing to consider a valid First Amend-
ment defense.104 
3. Right of Publicity Analysis 
Increasingly, commentators have gravitated toward an alterna-
tive approach that would utilize the transformative or predominant 
use test from right of publicity precedent. In fact, courts have sug-
                                                                                                                            
Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying a First Amendment 
“literary title” defense). 
100 Dr. Seuss 1997, 109 F.3d at 1396–97. 
101 Compare id., with Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 
1559, 1573 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (“Where alternative means of achieving the satiric or parodic 
ends exist that would not entail consumer confusion, the First Amendment will not 
protect the parodist from being held to infringe. The Court’s reasoning as to the fair use 
defense therefore applies equally to this issue.”). 
102 Dr. Seuss 1997, 109 F.3d at 1406. 
103 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[The likelihood of 
confusion test] treats the name of an artistic work as if it were no different from the name 
of an ordinary commercial product. However, this approach ignores the fact that the 
artistic work is not simply a commercial product but is also a means of communication. . . . 
[The test fails] to differentiate between those artists who choose titles for the purpose of 
legitimate artistic relevancy and those artists who choose misleading titles for the purpose 
of commercial gain.”). 
104 See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, 214 F.3d 658, 667–68 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s mark under a particularly compelling 
standard of likelihood of confusion); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the likelihood of confusion test 
“serve[s] to avoid First Amendment concerns” in trademark cases); Gottlieb Dev. 
LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (ignoring a 
First Amendment defense and holding for the defendant under a finding that the use was 
not likely to confuse audiences). 
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gested that false endorsement and right of publicity claims are very 
similar.105 In Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., the court recognized that 
right of publicity cases veer from traditional First Amendment in-
terests.106 In Hart, the court held that the transformative use test 
provided a more “nuanced” approach.107 While the case involved 
the exploitation of a college football player’s image in a video game, 
this more complex approach could also assist courts in classic 
trademark cases.108 The court also considered the predominant use 
test, exploring whether the mark’s use exploited the individual’s 
identity rather than commenting on their celebrity.109 Ultimately, 
the Hart court rejected this approach because the test called for a 
court’s subjective judgment concerning the dissection of a work.110 
Under this analysis, courts will encounter problems similar to the 
commercial speech analysis.111 The vague exploitation standard 
could have over-inclusive results, chilling filmmakers from exercis-
ing protected forms of speech in creative works.112 
The transformative use test originated in Comedy III Produc-
tions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.113 An artist sold lithographs and T-
shirts exploiting the images of the Three Stooges.114 Even though 
the artist made his design on a charcoal drawing and the items were 
not commercial products, the California Supreme Court refused to 
extend First Amendment protections to the artist’s use of the like-
ness of these famed comedy performers.115 In reaching its decision, 
                                                                                                                            
105 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003). 
106 717 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 2013). 
107 Id. at 158. 
108 Celebrity exploitation bears similarities to unauthorized uses of popular or 
“culturally relevant” marks. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972 (“[C]elebrities are ‘common 
points of reference for millions of individuals who may never interact with one another, 
but who share, by virtue of their participation in a mediated culture, a common 
experience and a collective memory.’” (quoting JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND 
MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 163 
(1990)). 
109 Hart, 717 F.3d at 153–54; see also Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 
2003) (introducing the predominant use test). 
110 Hart, 717 F.3d at 154. 
111 See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
112 See id. 
113 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
114 Id. at 800–01. 
115 Id. at 811. 
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the court reviewed prior balancing tests that considered whether 
the “proprietary interests at issue clearly outweigh the value of free 
expression in this context.”116 To the court, it was undisputed that 
not every use of a trademark is automatically protected under the 
First Amendment.117 Rather, the court remained very sensitive to 
the dangers of “appropriat[ing] the commercial value of the like-
ness of [a celebrity],” while recognizing that celebrities should not 
have the power to “censor . . . disagreeable portrayals.”118 The use 
cannot be “a literal depiction or imitation.”119 Instead, the final 
product must represent an original expression of the derivative au-
thor.120 Transformative elements include “parody, . . . factual-
reporting, . . . heavy-handed lampooning[, and] subtle social criti-
cism.”121 
However, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the video game 
company prevailed in its First Amendment defense for the “Ulala” 
character in the Space Channel 5 video game.122 The plaintiff 
claimed that the “Ulala” character violated American singer Kie-
rin Kirby’s right of publicity because Sega based Ulala off of Kir-
by’s appearance, career as a musician, and notable catchphrases.123 
Yet, the court held that the use was transformative.124 Importantly, 
the “setting for the game that features Ulala—as a space-age re-
porter in the [twenty-fifth] century—is unlike any public depiction 
of Kirby.”125 As a result, Sega’s use was merely similar and not a 
complete reproduction.126 In the wake of this decision, scholars 
questioned “whether placing an exact rendition of Kirby’s likeness 
                                                                                                                            
116 Id. at 806 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461 (Cal. 
1979)). 
117 Id. at 805–06 (“[T]he state’s interest in preventing the outright misappropriation of 
such intellectual property by others is not automatically trumped by the interest in free 
expression or dissemination of information.”). 
118 Id. at 806–07. 
119 Id. at 808. 
120 Id. at 809. 
121 Id. (citations omitted). 
122 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006). 
123 Id. at 609–11. 
124 Id. at 616. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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in a transformed setting alone would have shielded Sega’s use be-
hind the First Amendment.”127 
Recently, the transformative test has begun to encroach on cas-
es normally applying the Rogers test. In No Doubt v. Activision Pub-
lishing, Inc., the court applied the transformative use test to a right 
of publicity claim involving digital avatars of famous musicians in a 
video game.128 Citing the developer’s commercial motivations, the 
court did not find First Amendment protections for the “simply 
precise computer-generated reproductions.”129 When the court 
reached the unfair competition claim, it modified the application of 
the Rogers test by adopting elements of the transformative test.130 
In rejecting the developer’s First Amendment defense, the court 
cited the avatar’s non-transformative use, finding the work not ar-
tistically relevant.131 Accordingly, the court did not need to ap-
proach the explicitly misleading prong, holding that this non-
transformative use can confuse the public.132 Therefore, the misuse 
outweighed any artistic rights to free expression.133 This approach 
directly conflicts with most courts’ application of Rogers. Normally, 
the Rogers test “immunize[s] trademark uses on the ground that 
they did not obviously mislead even though application of the stan-
dard likelihood of confusion factors could potentially demonstrate 
consumer confusion.”134 
                                                                                                                            
127 See Wesley Wintermyer, Who Framed Rogers v. Grimaldi?: What Protects Trademark 
Holders Against First Amendment Immunity for Video Games?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1243, 1259 
(2013). 
128 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 415 (Ct. App. 2011). 
129 Id. at 411, 415; see also Beastie Boys, et al., v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 
424 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (ignoring First Amendment protections for a false or misleading 
endorsement case involving an infringing advertisement that created a misleading 
endorsement). 
130 No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 414–15. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. Additionally, the court implied that this requirement presents an undue burden 
on the plaintiff, remarking that it would be “almost impossible” for the plaintiff to prove 
the use was explicitly misleading. Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Bartholomew, supra note 44, at 51 (“The Rogers test represents a significant 
prospeech innovation in trademark law . . . .”). 
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II. REVIEWING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE ROGERS TEST 
A. Second Circuit’s Formulation and Modification of the Rogers Test 
The seminal test for balancing trademark property interests and 
rights in artistic expression originated in Rogers v. Grimaldi.135 In 
this case, an Italian film director made a film revolving around fic-
tional Italian cabaret singers who imitated Ginger Rogers and Fred 
Astaire.136 After a short run in American cinemas with mixed re-
views, Rogers claimed that the film gave a false impression of her 
endorsement, violated her right of publicity, and defamed her by 
depicting her in a negative light.137 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the defendant, holding that the title was a mere 
“exercise of artistic expression rather than commercial speech.”138 
On appeal, the Second Circuit clarified the ambiguity present in 
the lower court’s narrow application of the Lanham Act.139 The 
court decided that the Lanham Act “should be construed to apply 
to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consum-
er confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.”140 
Rather than simplifying the inquiry to commercial viability,141 the 
Lanham Act applies when the use “has no artistic relevance to the 
underlying work whatsoever, or, if it . . . explicitly misleads as to 
the source or the content of the work.”142 The Second Circuit rec-
ognized the possibility that the “Ginger and Fred” title could lead 
to consumer confusion, but, in context, the irony of the ambiguous 
title is a central element of the film.143 Therefore, the court held 
                                                                                                                            
135 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
136 Id. at 996–97. 
137 Id. at 997. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 998–99. 
140 Id. at 999. 
141 Reducing the test to a commercial inquiry would be virtually impossible due to the 
mixed artistic and economic nature of the movie industry. See supra notes 59–63 and 
accompanying text; see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) 
(holding that a business intent of profit does not deny films and other media free speech 
protection). 
142 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
143 Id. at 998–99. 
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that the filmmaker did not violate the Lanham Act, stating that a 
contrary decision would instead suppress artistic expression.144 
In the immediate aftermath of this decision, a parody case in 
the Second Circuit expanded the reach of the test beyond titles of 
works to the expressive elements within the work itself.145 In the 
parody Spy Notes, the authors utilized a humorous tone to riff on 
the infamous study books Cliffs Notes.146 The district court granted 
a preliminary injunction fearing the “unbridled freedom” the First 
Amendment could grant to parodists.147 On appeal, the court ap-
plied the Rogers test, ruling that expressive parodies require more 
protection than ordinary commercial products.148 The court de-
termined that it did not have to judge the artistry of the joke, but 
rather needed to prevent blatant consumer confusion.149 Further-
more, the court did not apply the same explicitly misleading test 
formulated in the Rogers decision.150 Rather, the court engaged in a 
limited likelihood of confusion analysis, insulating the parody un-
der the First Amendment, because it provided a great benefit to the 
public interest.151 
Shortly after this case, the Second Circuit tinkered with the li-
kelihood of confusion test, providing even more protections for art-
ist defendants. In Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications Internation-
al, Ltd., the publisher of a guide to a popular television show suc-
cessfully defended itself against the trademark claims of the intel-
lectual property holder of the television series.152 The court dis-
cussed the Rogers test’s application to different mediums, such as 
literary titles.153 Rather than utilize the explicitly misleading stan-
                                                                                                                            
144 Id. at 1001–02. 
145 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
146 Id. at 492. 
147 Id. at 493. 
148 Id. at 495. 
149 See id. at 495–96 (“But parody may be sophisticated as well as slapstick; a literary 
work is a parody if, taken as a whole, it pokes fun at its subject.”); see also Bartholomew, 
supra note 44, at 60 (“[T]rademark law should yield when no confusion exists, or other 
social benefits outweigh the potential for confusion.”). 
150 See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494–95. 
151 See id. at 495–97. 
152 996 F.2d 1366, 1370–71 (2d Cir. 1993). 
153 Id. at 1379. 
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dard, the plaintiff’s showing of likelihood of confusion must be 
“particularly compelling” to overcome First Amendment con-
cerns.154 This modified test recognizes a First Amendment pre-
sumption of validity by placing a higher burden on the plaintiff to 
prove a violation of the Lanham Act.155 Here, the Twin Peaks court 
analyzed the wording, appearance, and disclaimer of the title.156 
This searching inquiry could create a level of uncertainty and a rise 
in litigation costs.157 Not every circuit has adopted this approach.158 
Recently, in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Enter-
tainment Inc., the Southern District of New York applied this mod-
ified Rogers test.159 In the case, Louis Vuitton disputed the use of a 
knockoff bag in the Hangover: Part II.160 The film made it appear 
that one of the main characters owns an over-the-shoulder Louis 
Vuitton “Keepall” bag without notifying the audience that the bag 
is a fake.161 This scene was even included in commercials for the 
film.162 In the court’s analysis, the use was artistically relevant be-
cause the film intended for the bag to enhance the funny and snob-
bish image of the protagonist, rather than exploit the mark’s popu-
larity and good will.163 Furthermore, the court even felt that the bag 
introduced a tension between the characters.164 In the second stage 
of the analysis, the court questioned the plaintiff’s claim concern-
ing confusion as to the source or content of third-party goods.165 
On a side note, the court assumed that it is possible for a fictional 
                                                                                                                            
154 Id. 
155 Barrett, supra note 52, at 999–1000. Rather than allowing the defendant to receive 
complete immunity from misleading uses, the modified Rogers test involves a thorough 
analysis weighed in favor of the defendant. See id. 
156 Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1379–80. 
157 See id. 
158 Bartholomew, supra note 44, at 50 (“Although the Ninth Circuit has not adopted 
this ‘particularly compelling’ standard, it has set up its own inquiry that replaces the 
traditional multi-factor likelihood of confusion test with a judicial assessment tilted in the 
artist’s favor.”); see also infra Sections II.B–D. 
159 868 F. Supp. 2d 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
160 Id. at 174–75. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 175. 
163 Id. at 178; see also Robbins, supra note 35, at 606 (“Beyond having an effect on sales, 
trademarks have helped, and continue to help, carve out storylines and characters.”). 
164 Louis Vuitton, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
165 Id. at 180–81. 
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character to make an affirmative misrepresentation.166 Still, the 
court held that the film’s use did not pass the particularly compel-
ling likelihood of confusion standard, even if the claim was legally 
cognizable.167 The court felt most audience members would not 
realize the bag was a knockoff, because it only appears on-screen 
for a few seconds.168 Additionally, the character’s misrepresenta-
tions of the bag are a joke within the film that few audiences will 
take seriously.169 Ultimately, the claim was too indirect and im-
plausible that the court granted the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss.170 
In summary, the Second Circuit originated the artistically rele-
vant and not explicitly misleading test for First Amendment pro-
tections in unauthorized trademark use.171 Over the years, the cir-
cuit has modified its interpretation of explicitly misleading, apply-
ing a modified likelihood of confusion inquiry.172 This test slightly 
favors the defendant, while also extending the formal process of the 
inquiry.173 
B. Ninth Circuit’s Expansion of the Rogers Test 
The Ninth Circuit has crafted a simple and coherent applica-
tion of the Rogers test within a region that constantly must balance 
the First Amendment protections of creators and property interest 
of trademark holders. The Ninth Circuit adopted and expanded the 
Rogers test in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc..174 The manufacturer 
                                                                                                                            
166 See id. at 182. This conclusion presents a dangerous new area for judicial inquiry. 
Now, courts may have to interpret jokes and analyze the intent of fictional characters. At 
least in the Second Circuit, the resulting likelihood of confusion would not be sufficient to 
pass the particularly compelling floor. Id. 
167 Id. at 181–82. 
168 Id. at 182. 
169 Id. For example, the film’s character even mispronounces the Louis Vuitton brand 
for comedic effect. Id. at 178. 
170 Id. at 184–85; see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 
23, 32–33 (2003) (“The words of the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover 
matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.”). 
171 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
172 See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993); 
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 886 F.2d 490, 496–97 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
173 See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1379. 
174 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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of the famed Barbie doll sued a band that parodied the doll and its 
associated mark within a popular song.175 The Ninth Circuit origi-
nally expressed its satisfaction with the likelihood of confusion test, 
yet the court felt it did not adequately protect the “public’s inter-
est in free expression” for trademarks that “transcend their identi-
fying purpose . . . and become an integral part of our vocabu-
lary.”176 In order to properly protect both interests at stake, the ap-
pellate court applied the Rogers test.177 Here, the song was clearly 
relevant to the mark, because it was an obvious parody, poking fun 
at Barbie.178 Additionally, the mere use of Barbie in the title of the 
song was not explicitly misleading, because that result would 
“render Rogers a nullity.”179 As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the summary judgment ruling.180 
Soon after this decision, the Ninth Circuit began to narrow the 
MCA court’s holding. In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Produc-
tions, the toy manufacturer brought a trademark infringement claim 
against a photographer specializing in pictures of nude Barbie 
dolls.181 The artist displayed his photographs at festivals and on a 
website.182 The Ninth Circuit put a gloss on its earlier rulings by 
adding a “cultural significance” requirement on the exploited 
mark.183 Under this limitation, creators will only receive First 
Amendment protections for works that utilize marks which have 
entered the public discourse.184 While the MCA court mentioned 
the cultural significance of the Barbie trademark, the court did not 
explicitly require that the mark permeate the public discourse in 
order to trigger the First Amendment shield.185 Applying the Rogers 
                                                                                                                            
175 Id. at 898–99. 
176 Id. at 900. The Ninth Circuit still considered many of the likelihood of confusion 
factors before applying Rogers. See Kelly L. Baxter, Comment, Trademark Parody: How to 
Balance the Lanham Act with the First Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1179, 1200 
(2004). 
177 MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 901–02. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 902. 
180 Id. 
181 353 F.3d 792, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2003). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 807. 
184 Id. 
185 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 903, 906. 
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test, the Walking Mountain court reached the same conclusion as 
the MCA court, protecting the mark’s use as artistically relevant 
and not explicitly misleading.186 
Despite this additional limitation, the Ninth Circuit continued 
to protect artists’ work of expression, even in the face of tarnish-
ment claims. In E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, 
Inc., the plaintiff sued the developers of the Grand Theft Auto vid-
eo game for depicting the plaintiff’s strip club, the Play Pen, and 
calling it “Pig Pen.”187 The game earned an infamous reputation 
for its “irreverent and sometimes crass brand of humor, gratuitous 
violence and sex, and overall seediness.”188 The game featured a 
disclaimer that the location was fictional and the creators consi-
dered it a parody that “lampooned the seedy underbelly of Los An-
geles and the people, business and places [that] comprise it.”189 As 
a result, a nominative fair use defense did not apply, because the 
developers testified that they did not have the intent to critique the 
specific establishment.190 Yet, the court determined that the defen-
dant received First Amendment protections under Rogers.191 The 
plaintiff conceded that the developer’s use was artistic.192 Howev-
er, the plaintiff attempted to dispute the relevance of the use as fail-
ing to reference the Play Pen.193 Additionally, the plaintiff argued 
that the defendant should not receive First Amendment protec-
tions because the Play Pen was not a cultural icon.194 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and re-
fined the modified Rogers test from Walking Mountain.195 Removing 
the referential and cultural icon requirements, the court held that 
                                                                                                                            
186 Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 807. 
187 547 F.3d 1095, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2008). 
188 Id. at 1096. 
189 Id. at 1097. 
190 Id. at 1098–99. 
191 Id. at 1099 (“Although this test traditionally applies to uses of a trademark in the title 
of an artistic work, there is no principled reason why it ought not also apply to the use of a 
trademark in the body of the work.”). 
192 Id. at 1099–1100. 
193 Id. at 1100. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
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“the level of relevance merely must be above zero.”196 Here, the 
distinctive “look and feel” of urban neighborhoods relevant to 
making a cartoon-style parody satisfied the low relevance thre-
shold.197 The court held that the work was not explicitly misleading 
as the public would not entertain the notion that a strip club would 
have produced the video game.198 Furthermore, the court said the 
location was “incidental” to the overall story and “unambiguously 
not the main selling point of the [g]ame.”199 Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the summary judgment ruling in favor of the de-
fendant.200 
Although a tarnishment claim would have proved quite chal-
lenging for a strip club, in Roxbury Entertainment v. Penthouse Media 
Group, Inc., the plaintiff obtained the television rights of the Route 
66 mark and sued over a pornographic film titled Route 66.201 Here, 
the district court considered a First Amendment defense and found 
the work artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading.202 The 
“tenuous” relationship between the mental imagery of the mark 
and the content of the film passed the minimal relevance threshold 
of the test.203 Additionally, the court held that there was no con-
cern of consumers believing that the plaintiff sponsored the film.204 
Even though this case involved a clear commercial use, the film did 
not explicitly mislead consumers and received First Amendment 
protections.205 Here, the taste of the content did not affect the 
court’s analysis, yet other courts have granted less protection for 
                                                                                                                            
196 Id. But see Lateef Mtima, What’s Mine Is Mine but What’s Yours Is Ours: IP 
Imperialism, the Right of Publicity, and Intellectual Property Social Justice in the Digital 
Information Age, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 323, 363–64 (2012) (“[S]uch a standard 
essentially eliminate[s] the relevance assessment . . . .”). 
197 E.S.S., 547 F.3d at 1100. Yet this analysis differs from the Rogers court’s initial 
inquiry, as “[t]he court instead demonstrated a willingness to consider a broader concept 
of actionable confusion beyond that engendered by overt misrepresentations as to 
source.” Thomas M. Byron, Spelling Confusion: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s View of 
the “Explicitly Misleading” Prong of the Rogers Test, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 16 (2011). 
198 E.S.S., 547 F.3d at 1100. 
199 Id. at 1100–01. 
200 Id. at 1101. 
201 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172–73 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
202 Id. at 1175–76. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 1176. 
205 Id. 
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morally questionable works.206 As a result, trademark holders lose 
some dominion over their intellectual property because the court’s 
failure to recognize the marketplace confusion over the work’s use 
of the mark makes it increasingly difficult for mark holders to con-
trol the public depictions and associations of their brands.207 
On the other hand, the decision in Rebelution, LLC v. Perez dif-
fered from precedent.208 In this case, international recording artist 
Pitbull titled one of his songs “Rebelution,” even though a reggae 
band owned the trademark for the title.209 The district court ap-
plied a stringent version of the Rogers test, which required that the 
appropriated mark be of “such cultural significance that it has be-
come [an] integral part of public’s vocabulary.”210 Here, “Rebelu-
tion” had not transcended its identifying purpose and had not en-
tered the public discourse.211 The court further complicated the 
Rogers test by formally requiring that the unauthorized use refer to 
the “meaning associated with plaintiff’s mark” in order to pass the 
relevance threshold.212 The court found it was impossible for Pit-
                                                                                                                            
206 See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., No. C78-679A, 1981 WL 1402, at *16 (N.D. 
Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (failing to consider First Amendment implications for the finding of 
infringement for the parody use of a plaintiff’s mark in a pornographic magazine); Barrett, 
supra note 52, at 991 n.72 (“[S]ome of these other decisions could be characterized as 
finding infringement due largely to the court’s distaste for the content of the defendant’s 
noncommercial expression, which is certainly inconsistent with First Amendment 
principles.”); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free 
Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 
910–16 (arguing that in some cases courts appear to have based infringement decisions on 
“visceral disapproval” of defendant’s use). 
207 See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
208 732 F. Supp. 2d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Other courts within the Ninth Circuit have 
rejected the Rebelution decision. See, e.g., Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, 
Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (referring to the case as an “outlier 
decision from this district”). 
209 Rebelution, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 885–86. 
210 Id. at 887; see also Warner Bros. Entm’t v. Glob. Asylum, Inc., No. CV 12–9547 PSG 
(CWx), 2012 WL 6951315, *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012) (holding that the Rogers test 
applies to the term “hobbit,” even though the “term may not be integral to the public’s 
vocabulary, but it has gained some measure of use as a term to refer to small 
creatures . . .”). But see Stewart Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Grp. LLC, Case No. CV 
10–2982 GAF (SSx), 2011 WL 12877019, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011) (“Thus, there is 
no basis for applying the Rogers test only when the expressive or artistic speech makes 
reference to culturally significant marks.”). 
211 Rebelution, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 888. 
212 Id. at 889. 
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bull to meet this standard, because the artist thought the word was 
imaginary.213 This result prevents artists from “co-opt[ing even] 
the most fanciful marks.”214 The court warned that a change in the 
law “would allow any person to ascribe their own meaning to a 
mark and thereafter argue that their artistic work bears relevance to 
this opportunistically-defined meaning.”215 Ultimately, the court 
denied Pitbull’s motion for summary judgment based on the like-
lihood of confusion factors.216 
In Dita, Inc. v. Judith Mendez, another district court in the 
Ninth Circuit adhered to the Rebelution analysis.217 A “high fa-
shion” eyewear designer brought an infringement and unfair com-
petition claim against an entertainer selling jewelry, leather goods, 
and clothing with the designer’s trademark.218 In analyzing a First 
Amendment defense, the court reiterated the importance of the 
Rogers test because the First Amendment did not “automatically 
insulate” artistic works from liability.219 Here, the court explained 
that the entertainer’s use did not merit First Amendment protec-
tions because the defendant used the mark to promote their own 
product, rather than “describe or comment upon the plaintiff’s 
mark or product.”220 This application implies that the Rogers test 
would only apply to parody cases, yet other rulings in this circuit 
have explained that a mere reference in isolation is enough to war-
rant protection.221 Furthermore, the court stated that even if the 
Rogers test applied, the entertainer’s use did not pass the referen-
                                                                                                                            
213 Id. (“Instead, [Pitbull] adopted the word rebelution because he saw it on a store 
front in Miami: ‘I was driving by, and I seen it, and I said, Wow, that is a great word, 
because it had everything to do with me in the music business, my family in Cuba and me 
just as a fighter in general.’”). 
214 Id. However, this referential standard has a low threshold, because the court agreed 
that even the loose mental connection of Route 66 and road imagery in the Roxbury 
decision remain consistent with this decision. Id. 
215 Id. 
216 See id. at 898–99. While the Rebelution court modified the Rogers test even further, 
the facts of this case indicated that Pitbull attempted to co-opt the mark by using the mark 
in the same way the owner had used it. This fact pattern may be distinguished from the 
other cases analyzed within this circuit. 
217 No. CV 10–6277 PSG (FMOx), 2010 WL 5140855, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010). 
218 Id. at *1. 
219 Id. at *2. 
220 Id. 
221 See supra notes 187–207 and accompanying text. 
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tial requirement and the plaintiff’s mark was not culturally signifi-
cant.222 As a result, the court denied the entertainer’s motion to 
dismiss.223 
Recently, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have attempted to 
resolve these inconsistent decisions. In VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony 
Computer Entertainment America LLC, an Italian floor manufactur-
er brought an infringement claim against Sony’s Gran Turismo 
games.224 The court applied the Rogers test, extending First 
Amendment protections to the “body of the expressive works.”225 
While the manufacturer argued that its mark did not meet the 
“cultural significance” requirement, the court rejected this addi-
tional limitation on artistic relevance.226 This reading of the Rogers 
test remained consistent with previous decision in E.S.S. because, 
in that case, the disputed mark had “little cultural significance,” 
yet still received protection.227 Therefore, the court held that pre-
vious decisions did not preclude Rogers from applying to works that 
are “not cultural icons.”228 Here, the court found the mark’s use 
to be artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading.229 It was 
unnecessary for the court to determine “exactly how artistically re-
levant” the mark connects to the game, so long as the use relev-
ance is “above zero.”230 Additionally, the court held it was irrele-
vant “whether the defendants used the VIRAG® mark for com-
mercial gain in addition to using it for artistic purposes.”231 Fur-
                                                                                                                            
222 Dita, 2010 WL 5140855, at *3. 
223 Id. at *6. 
224 No. 3:15–CV–01729–LB, 2015 WL 5000102, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), appeal 
docketed, No. 16-15137 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2016). 
225 Id. at *9 (citing E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 
1099 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
226 Id. (“[T]he fact that Barbie made its way into the global lexicon does not mean every 
mark must do so in order for its use to be protected by the First Amendment.” (quoting 
Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 1134, 1140–41 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014))). 
227 See id. (mentioning that the disputed mark in E.S.S. had “little cultural 
significance,” yet still received protection (quoting E.S.S., 547 F.3d at 1100)). 
228 Id. at *10. 
229 Id. at *11–13. 
230 Id. at *12 (quoting E.S.S., 547 F.3d at 1100). Furthermore, the court discouraged 
judges from engaging in “artistic analysis.” Id. at *11 (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 
724 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
231 Id. at *12. 
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thermore, the manufacturers’ claims of false sponsorship were in-
sufficient to prove an explicitly misleading use because a mere use 
alone is not enough, even if there is also consumer confusion.232 
For an explicitly misleading claim, the Ninth Circuit often requires 
an “‘explicit indication’ . . . ‘overt claim’ or ‘explicit misstate-
ment.’”233 However, the court left open the possibility of satisfying 
this standard by framing the mark’s use as the “main selling point 
for the game.”234 Although VIRAG was not the main selling point 
and received First Amendment protection, this uncertainty could 
affect future decisions.235 
Another recent district court decision has approached the con-
troversial split within the circuit. In Twentieth Century Fox Televi-
sion v. Empire Distribution Inc., the owner of a media enterprise sent 
a cease and desist notice to a television network in connection with 
the show “Empire” and the show’s soundtracks, which allegedly 
created confusion over the “Empire” and “Empire Distribution” 
marks.236 In response, Fox brought a declaratory judgment action 
against Empire, claiming that the defendant “attempt[ed] to ex-
tend its use of another’s trademark much further than in any other 
case applying Rogers.”237 As a result, the plaintiff asked the court to 
place a greater emphasis on the likelihood of confusion test, but the 
court rejected this position, upholding the Rogers test as the “‘only 
relevant legal framework’” for this First Amendment question.238 
Significantly, the court formally rejected the cultural significance 
inquiry.239 Applying the Rogers test, the court reiterated that the 
Ninth Circuit has never adopted a referential requirement.240 Even 
                                                                                                                            
232 Id. 
233 Id. at *13 (quoting Brown, 724 F.3d at 1245). 
234 Id. (quoting Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Textron Inc., No. C 12-00118 WHA, 2012 WL 
3042668, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012)). 
235 Id. 
236 161 F. Supp. 3d 902, 904 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
237 Id. at 906. 
238 Id. (quoting Brown, 724 F.3d at 1242). 
239 Id. at 906–07. 
240 Id. at 907–08 (“At most, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that [the referential 
requirement] is a fact which a court may consider.”). Rather, the court argued that the 
Rogers analysis should ensure that marks are not “arbitrarily chosen to . . . exploit the[ir] 
publicity value . . . .” Id. at 908 (quoting Stewart Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Grp., 
LLC, No. CV 10-2982 GAF (SSX), 2011 WL 12877019, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011)). 
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though Fox was a junior user and did not reference Empire Distri-
bution’s mark, Fox’s use was “clearly relevant” to the plot and 
location of the defendant’s television show.241 Moreover, the court 
aimed to avoid the “perverse result” of not protecting uses that 
actually disclaim the mark’s origin, rather than a veiled attempt to 
free ride on the mark’s goodwill.242 The court held that the plain-
tiff’s use was not explicitly misleading, even if there was a danger 
of some consumer confusion, and granted summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs, noting that “Empire Distribution’s only ar-
guments against summary judgment require the [c]ourt to rewrite 
the Rogers test.”243 
C. Sixth Circuit’s Modified Rogers Test 
An outlier among courts, the Sixth Circuit has adopted an ap-
proach that favors the mark holder in these First Amendment 
trademark cases. In Parks v. LaFace Records, a rap group referenced 
Rosa Parks within the title of one of their songs.244 However, the 
song is not about Parks and makes only an indirect reference to the 
“back of the bus.”245 Applying Rogers, the district court concluded 
that the First Amendment provided a defense to Parks’ Lanham 
Act claim because there was no confusion, and the title was not ex-
plicitly misleading.246 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
lower court’s analysis, creating a significant barrier to the First 
Amendment shield.247 In analyzing the decision, the court rejected 
the likelihood of confusion and alternative avenues tests, and in-
                                                                                                                            
241 See id. at 907. (“The word ‘Empire’ is clearly relevant to Fox’s work because the 
Empire Series tells the story of characters struggling for literal control over an 
entertainment company called ‘Empire Enterprises,’ and figurative control over the vast 
‘empire’ that Lucious Lyon has built. Additionally, the Empire Series is set in New York, 
the Empire State. Indeed, Empire Distribution concedes that the word ‘Empire’ has 
artistic relevance to Fox’s work.”). 
242 Id. at 908. Additionally, the court mentioned that limiting the test to parody 
situations would “severely chill otherwise constitutionally protected speech.” Id. 
243 Id. at 909–10. 
244 329 F.3d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 2003). 
245 Id. at 452–53. 
246 See id. at 444. 
247 See id. at 447. (“However, the First Amendment cannot permit anyone who cries 
‘artist’ to have carte blanche when it comes to naming and advertising his or her works, art 
though it may be.”). 
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stead adopted a stringent application of the Rogers test.248 The 
court found a genuine issue of material fact concerning the artistic 
relevance of the title of the song.249 Distinguishing the Rogers’ title 
as reflecting the plot and Mattel as a parody case, the court viewed 
the Rosa Parks title as a marketing maneuver to increase the song’s 
potential sales.250 The court held that the writer of the lyrics admit-
ted that the song was a vague metaphor singling out competitors, 
rather than a reference to Rosa Parks.251 However, the court left 
the artistic relevance issue for a jury on remand.252 Furthermore, 
the court held that the title was not explicitly misleading.253 Thus, 
the Sixth Circuit probed further into the defendants’ specific use of 
the mark by instituting a referential requirement.254 
Shortly after the Parks decision, the Sixth Circuit confronted 
the First Amendment in the trademark context in ETW Corp. v. 
Jireh Publishing, Inc.255 The licensing agent of professional golfer 
Tiger Woods alleged trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair 
                                                                                                                            
248 Id. at 447–52. 
249 Id. at 458. 
250 Id. at 453 (“Back of the Bus, for example, would be a title that is obviously relevant to 
the content of the song, but it also would not have the marketing power of an icon of the 
civil rights movement.
 
Choosing Rosa Parks’ name as the title to the song unquestionably 
enhanced the song’s potential sale to the consuming public.”); see also Seale v. Gramercy 
Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that the image of a celebrity on 
the cover of a soundtrack for a movie was a disguised advertisement, because the CD had 
various songs by various artists with no direct connection to the celebrity or his political 
movement). But see Jason Levine, Can the Right of Publicity Afford Free Speech? A New 
Right of Publicity Test for First Amendment Cases, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171, 
226 (2004) (“[The song in Parks] would seem to contain at least a modicum of artistic 
relevance to the publicly known persona of Rosa Parks.”). 
251 Parks, 329 F.3d at 452–53. 
252 See id. at 453–56 (“If the requirement of ‘relevance’ is to have any meaning at all, it 
would not be unreasonable to conclude that the title Rosa Parks is not relevant to the 
content of the song in question.”). But see Lisa Tomiko Blackburn, The Recording Academy 
(R) Entertainment Law Initiative 2003 Legal Writing Contest: Title Blanding: How the 
Lanham Act Strips Artistic Expression from Song Titles, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 837, 
842 (2005) (arguing that this application “restrict[s] an artist who envisions the song title 
as part of the piece of art itself . . . ” resulting in “title blanding”). 
253 Parks, 329 F.3d at 456. However, the court recognized the question of relevance 
concerning the title and remanded the issue to the lower court. 
254 See id. at 459; see also Mitchell David Greggs, Shakin’ It to the Back of the Bus: How 
Parks v. LaFace Uses the Artistic Relevance Test to Adjudicate Artistic Content, 61 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1287, 1310 (2004). 
255 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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competition claims against the publisher of a painting that com-
memorated Woods’ victory at the Masters Tournament.256 The 
court held that use of the “Tiger Woods” mark was merely de-
scriptive and protected under fair use, but went through a more 
searching inquiry for the unfair competition and false endorsement 
claims.257 Here, the alleged misuse involved a celebrity’s identity, 
so the likelihood of confusion test was inadequate because it failed 
to fully consider First Amendment protections.258 In applying the 
Rogers test, the court believed that the artist’s rendering of Woods 
was “much more than a mere literal likeness.”259 Rather, the artist 
created a panorama of a historical event celebrating culture.260 As a 
result, the court held that the work was unquestionably relevant, 
even under the Parks interpretation.261 Furthermore, even if there 
was confusion, the court found no overt misrepresentations.262 
Therefore, the court held that “Wood[s’] right[s] . . . must yield to 
the First Amendment.”263 Thus, the Sixth Circuit expanded the 
Rogers test to cover third party trademarks within the work itself, 
beyond the mere title.264 
Even though the ETW court applied the more exacting relev-
ance test, a recent lower court case in the Sixth Circuit has rejected 
the Parks referential requirement.265 The plaintiff owned the mark 
                                                                                                                            
256 Id. at 918–19. 
257 Id. at 920–21. 
258 Id. at 926. Even though the court mentioned the more liberal case Mattel v. MCA 
Records, it appears that the Sixth Circuit has limited its version of the Rogers test to 
contested celebrity use. See id. at 926–28. 
259 Id. at 936. 
260 Id. 
261 See id. at 936 n.18. 
262 See id. at 938. 
263 Id. 
264 See Byron, supra note 197, at 8.  However, this decision could merely reflect the 
court’s efforts to protect a “poor” artist creating a painting of historic event from the 
lawsuit of a highly marketable sports figure. Thus, the successful First Amendment 
defense in this clearly commercial context could represent an outlier holding influenced 
by public policy concerns. See Joseph R. Dreitler, Comment, The Tiger Woods Case—Has 
the Sixth Circuit Abandoned Trademark Law? ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 38 AKRON 
L. REV. 337, 350-51 (2005). 
265 Rebellion Devs. Ltd. v. Stardock Entm’t, Inc., No. 12-12805, 2013 WL 1944888, at 
*3 (E.D. Mich. May 9, 2013). 
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Rebellion for use with amusement machines.266 The defendants 
released a game that the public sometimes referred to as Rebel-
lion.267 The plaintiff attempted to avoid the constitutional question 
by stating that the defendant did not innocently infringe because 
the defendant did not directly reference a trademarked term.268 Yet 
the court rejected this argument, recognizing the “inextricably in-
tertwined” relationship between commercial and artistic 
attributes.269 The court further held that the game met the low ar-
tistic relevance threshold because it asked players to choose be-
tween the “loyalist” or “rebel” factions.270 This application of the 
test overlooks the referential requirement, merely searching for 
“some artistic relevance.”271 Furthermore, even though the defen-
dants “willfully attempted to capitalize on the reputation of [the 
p]laintiffs,” the use was not explicitly misleading because the de-
fendants did not utilize “overt misrepresentation[s].”272 On these 
grounds, the court dismissed the claim.273 
D. Seventh Circuit’s Refusal to Adopt the Rogers Test 
The Seventh Circuit approached First Amendment trademark 
protections in Eastland Music Group, LLC v. Lionsgate Entertain-
ment, Inc.274 The district court applied the Rogers test to the claim 
that the film 50/50 infringed on the trademark “PHIFTY-50,” 
however, the court did not state whether the test was appropriate 
within the circuit.275 The court dismissed the claim, holding that 
there was “no question” that the title had artistic relevance and 
was not explicitly misleading.276 On appeal, mark owner Eastland 
                                                                                                                            
266 Id. at *1. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at *3. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at *5. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at *6. 
273 Id. 
274 707 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2013). 
275 Eastland Music Grp., LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., No. 11-C-8224, 2012 WL 
2953188, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2012) (“The Seventh Circuit has not spoken on the 
propriety of [the Rogers] test.”), aff’d, 707 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2013). 
276 Id. (mentioning that the film reveals that the title is a reference to the protagonist’s 
50/50 odds of surviving a rare form of cancer). This application certainly ignores the 
Sixth Circuit’s referential requirement. See supra Section II.C. 
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Music Group (“EMG”) argued that the district court’s decision 
granted the defendants “carte blanche to use and infringe upon 
EMG’s trademark(s) no matter how much time, money and effort 
EMG has put into building its brand.”277 EMG disagreed with the 
court’s outcome, citing the fact that “the vast majority of the mov-
ie is not about the character’s ‘50/50’ diagnosis . . . [but, rather,] 
the lead character’s personal relationships.”278 While this argu-
ment has merit, an opposite ruling would call for judges to engage 
in unqualified artistic determinations that could create a dangerous 
chilling effect.279 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit punted on adopt-
ing or rejecting the Rogers test to “avoid unnecessary constitution-
al adjudication.”280 
Prior to the Eastland Music decision, the Seventh Circuit had 
elected to avoid answering First Amendment questions in these 
unauthorized trademark use cases. In Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic 
Arts Inc., a district court in the Seventh Circuit heard a case involv-
ing the use of a trademarked name on weapons in a video game.281 
The Seventh Circuit had not yet opined on the Rogers approach to 
balancing First Amendment and intellectual property interests.282 
In the end, the court accepted the parties’ request to apply the Rog-
ers test.283 For this court, the test would bar trademark claims “un-
less the use of the plaintiff’s likeness is ‘wholly unrelated to the 
[work] or [is] simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the 
sale of goods or services.’”284 Even though the mark holder argued 
that the use was an “isolated element[] in the work” with no rela-
tion to the story, the court found this use was artistically relevant 
                                                                                                                            
277 Brief of Appellant at 16, Eastland Music Grp., LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 707 
F.3d 869 (7th Cir. July 19, 2012) (No. 12-2928). 
278 Id. at 17. 
279 See infra Part III. 
280 Eastland Music Grp., 707 F.3d at 871. Rather, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
“complaint fails at the threshold . . . [to] allege that the use of ‘50/50’ as a title has 
caused any confusion about the film’s source.” Id. 
281 No. 1:09–CV–1236–JMS–DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011). 
282 Id. at *4 n.1 (“Although the parties agree that the [c]ourt should adopt the test set 
forth by the Second Circuit in Rogers, the Seventh Circuit has not yet spoken on the 
propriety of this test.”). 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at *4 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
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within this “fictional world.”285 The court reiterated that “any 
connection” could satisfy the artistic relevance standard, noting 
that it is not the court’s role to parse the “meaningful[ness of] the 
relationship between a trademark and the content of a literary 
work.”286 Additionally, the court held that the use was not explicit-
ly misleading or confusing.287 The plaintiff argued that the trade-
marked weapon was touted as “arguably the most powerful gun 
available” in the game, yet the court found this claim unpersua-
sive.288 The court indicated that the mark was not the “selling 
point of the game,” thereby adopting a high bar for the explicitly 
misleading prong.289 
In Fortres Grand Corporation v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., 
the owner of the “Clean Slate” mark brought a trademark in-
fringement claim against Warner Bros. for a reference to a fictional 
“clean slate” software program in the film The Dark Knight Ris-
es.290 Similar to the Louis Vuitton case, the district court struggled 
with the lack of precedent on fictional product infringements.291 
The court reasoned that in comparing the final products, the film’s 
display of a fictional product did not harm the software compa-
ny.292 Additionally, Warner Bros. remained insulated from mislead-
ing sponsorship claims because the advertised product was fiction-
                                                                                                                            
285 Id. at *4–5 (“[E]ven if the [c]ourt accepts the characterization as attenuated, such 
connection is enough to satisfy the Rogers test: The gentleman-bandit, commonly known 
for his public persona as a ‘flashy gangster who dressed well, womanized, drove around in 
fast cars, and sprayed Tommy Guns,’ has above-zero relevance to a game whose premise 
enables players to act like members of the mafia and spray Tommy Guns.” (citations 
omitted)). 
286 Id. at *6. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at *6–8 (“To be ‘explicitly misleading,’ the defendant’s work must make some 
affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement, beyond the mere use 
of plaintiff’s name or other characteristic.”). 
289 Id. at *7–8. 
290 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 924 (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 763 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2014). 
291 See id. (“Is it trademark infringement if a fictional company or product in a movie or 
television drama bears the same name or brand as a real company or product?” (quoting 6 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:149 (4th ed.))). 
292 See id. at 929; see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 
(C.D. Ill. 2003) (“[I]t appears unlikely . . . that any consumer would be more likely to buy 
or watch George [of the Jungle] 2 because of any mistaken belief that Caterpillar sponsored 
this movie.”). 
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al, and,  therefore, the use did not identify a source.293 The district 
court also entertained a First Amendment defense, applying the 
Rogers test and finding that the work was artistically relevant and 
not explicitly misleading.294 The court applied a low relevance 
standard, concluding that the use of a mark as part of the plot satis-
fies the Rogers test.295 Importantly, the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
adoption of a referential requirement that would prevent the test 
from applying to reverse confusion claims.296 The court agreed 
with the stance that this additional restriction would limit protec-
tion to parodies, while creating a monopoly on certain words, chill-
ing filmmakers.297 The district court granted the motion to dis-
miss.298 Perplexingly, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed this 
decision, but refused to even consider a First Amendment defense 
because it was unnecessary to the court’s holding.299 
Overall, the district courts within the Seventh Circuit appear to 
apply the Rogers test with the same consistency as the Ninth Cir-
cuit.300 The lower courts analyze the artistic relevance and explicit-
ly misleading aspects of the unauthorized use of the trademark.301 
While these courts use the First Amendment to shield content 
creators from any infringement liability, on appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit has repeatedly avoided the constitutional issue by deciding 
the factual matter purely under the likelihood of confusion stan-
dard.302 As a result, the precedent of the Rogers test remains merely 
persuasive within the Seventh Circuit.303 Furthermore, the applica-
                                                                                                                            
293 Fortres Grand Corp., 947 F. Supp. 2d at 930. 
294 Id. at 931–32. 
295 Id. at 932. 
296 Id. at 932–33. 
297 Id. at 933. 
298 Id. at 934. 
299 Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 705–06 (7th Cir. 
2014) (citing Eastland Music Grp., LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 707 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 
2013)). The Seventh Circuit held that the only relevant factor in the analysis was the 
similarity of the marks, yet the factor was not dispositive, when analyzed in the context of 
the other weaker factors. Id. at 705. 
300 See supra Sections II.B, notes 274–99 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 274–99 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra notes 274–80 , 290–99 and accompanying text. 
303 See id. 
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tion of the test appears to hinge on the mutual adoption of con-
flicted parties.304 
III. PROPOSING A CLEAR AND CONSISTENT TEST TO 
BENEFIT ARTISTS AND PROTECTIVE MARK HOLDERS 
The circuits vary on a multitude of issues concerning the appli-
cation of the Rogers test. The Second Circuit formulated the test in 
relation to artistic uses within titles, but the circuit opted to extend 
their application to the content within a work.305 However, this 
original approach morphed from a quick application with a limited 
inquiry into the likelihood of confusion factors to a fact-intensive 
analysis favoring the defendant’s free expression.306 The Seventh 
Circuit remains totally unpredictable due to the circuit’s refusal to 
clarify the correct approach to balancing First Amendment and 
trademark rights.307 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent 
application of a referential requirement further complicates an art-
ist’s creative process and decision to litigate.308 Finally, the most 
contentious decisions reside in the Ninth Circuit, where narrow 
interpretations of the Rogers decision demand the artist’s use to 
reference a culturally significant mark to receive First Amendment 
protection.309 Yet, recent Ninth Circuit decisions have rejected 
these requirements for a very liberal defense of artistic works that 
provide little to no control for mark holders.310 
Across the circuits, most decisions favor the artist, but “uncer-
tain, lengthy, and expensive” litigation could have disastrous chill-
ing effects.311 The current conflict between circuits will result in 
trademark users seeking an unnecessary license.312 This risk-averse 
strategy will often result in forsaking original artistic decisions in 
                                                                                                                            
304 See note 283 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra Section II.A. 
306 See id. 
307 See supra Section II.D. 
308 See supra Section II.C. 
309 See supra Section II.B. 
310 See notes 224–43 and accompanying text. 
311 William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 
2268–69, 2275 (2010). 
312 Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits on 
Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352, 352–53 (2007). 
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order to avoid possible legal conflicts.313 In effect, the proliferation 
of licensed markets informs consumers, treating “licensing as the 
norm” within society.314 This feedback loop results in an expansion 
of trademark entitlements fortified by the public’s misguided per-
ception.315 Even though trademark users may be able to surmount a 
reasonable defense against infringement, risk-averse film studios 
and insurance companies prefer to seek a license.316 These profit-
seeking gatekeepers often determine that the “potential cost of de-
fending a lawsuit is too high, even when discounted for the low li-
kelihood of getting sued and the very low likelihood of paying dam-
ages.”317 As a result, this “excessive caution” forces parties to pay 
unnecessary licensing fees, while potentially affecting the creative 
process, harming the quality of entertainment for the market con-
sumer.318 For example, the rights holders of Sherlock Holmes ef-
fectively threatened “the entertainment powerhouse” Warner 
Bros. to remove any hints of a “gay subtext regarding Holmes,” 
changing the final version of the film.319 The current market deters 
“sinking costs into a product that may later be enjoined,” because 
clearing rights can be a long and arduous process that ultimately 
stifles creativity.320 
On the other hand, promotional arrangements have further 
complicated the relationship between artistic endeavors and dis-
guised commercials. Instead of paying a fee for a trademark license, 
                                                                                                                            
313 McGeveran, supra note 311, at 2276. 
314 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 907–08 (2007). 
315 Id. at 908. 
316 Id. at 913. 
317 McGeveran, supra note 311, at 2276; see also Elizabeth Rosenblatt, The Adventure of 
the Shrinking Public Domain, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 613 (2015). 
318 McGeveran, supra note 311, at 2276; see also THE INCREDIBLES (Walt Disney Home 
Entertainment 2005) (director’s commentary) (noting that the writer and director of the 
film wanted to call a bomb-throwing French villain “Bomb Perignon,” but fear of a 
lawsuit from champagne maker Dom Perignon caused the creative team to change the 
name to “Bomb Voyage”). But see McGeveran, supra note 311, at 2277 (“On the other 
hand, few defendants would consider their ability to refer to particular trademarks to be 
central to their life’s work. Sometimes the mark, even if helpful, is not essential to the 
message they want to convey.”). 
319 See Rosenblatt, supra note 317, at 565, 613–14. 
320 Id. at 619. 
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the mark owner pays a fee to the content creator.321 These ar-
rangements have been very successful within the entertainment 
industry, effectively lowering production costs and providing an 
additional source of film revenue.322 As product placement is 
commonplace in the industry, the notion of unauthorized trade-
mark use fails to pierce the minds of consumers. Compounding this 
idea, popular films often satirize product placement, utilizing 
“jokes that assume audience familiarity with the practice.”323 In 
addition to product placement’s penetration of popular culture, 
certain filmmakers even choose to blur out the trademarks of items 
they use in their films.324 This pixilation results in the public 
thought that filmmakers cannot use marks, even if the use is artisti-
cally relevant and not explicitly misleading.325 Thus, the combina-
tion of obvious product placements and glaring avoidance tactics 
further propels the perception that licensing is the norm.326 
 Furthermore, it would benefit the public to impose punitive 
measures against trademark bullies attempting to use courts as a 
weapon to silence content creators. For example, the plaintiff in 
the VIRAG decision, an Italian manufacturer, has already filed an 
appeal even though the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                            
321 Gibson, supra note 314, at 914. 
322 In fact, in the late 1990s, product placement generated around fifteen percent of 
Hollywood’s feature film revenue, and in the early 2000s, product placement helped 
reduce the industry’s production costs by twenty-five percent. Kim Bartel Sheehan & 
Aibing Guo, “Leaving on a (Branded) Jet Plane”: An Exploration of Audience Attitudes 
Towards Product Assimilation in Television Content, J. CURRENT ISSUES & RES. ADVERT. 
Spring 2005, at 79, 80. 
323 Gibson, supra note 314, at 919. 
324 See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR 
USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 21 (2005) (quoting 
a filmmaker for the proposition that “you see everything being blurred now, because for 
the first time, [we are] able to do that technically without it being a big deal”). 
325 See Gibson, supra note 314, at 918. This result is unfortunate. While the blurring 
tactic could guarantee insulation from infringement lawsuits, this technique undermines 
the current case precedent. See supra Part II. Furthermore, certain filmmakers do not 
even consider the legal implications of blurring logos, favoring the tactic to “minimize the 
‘damage’ (or distractions) to the film.” Abe Sauer, Hollywood Marketers Face the 
Impossible: Blurring Product Placements in Sandler Films, BRANDCHANNEL (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://brandchannel.com/2011/01/18/hollywood-marketers-face-the-impossible-
blurring-product-placements-in-sandler-films/ [http://perma.cc/ZP7G-FL3P]. 
326 Gibson, supra note 314, at 919. 
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claims with prejudice.327 Rising legal costs could pressure Sony into 
settling with VIRAG rather than continuing a lengthy appeals 
process,328 even though the appellate court will likely rule in So-
ny’s favor. One possible way to prevent this perverse result is to 
impose judicial sanctions against this borderline frivolous appeal or 
even force the aggressive mark holders to pay for the defendant’s 
legal fees when the plaintiffs eventually lose.329 
In order to reduce the proliferation of unnecessary licenses, 
courts and legislators should strive to “increase . . . the predictabil-
ity and clarity of trademark fair use . . . making adjudication faster 
and less expensive” for content creators.330 To achieve this result, 
serious consideration must be given to a shift from general stan-
dards to a regime of ex ante rules.331 Whereas standards apply “af-
ter the fact” rules could provide more guidance and further assur-
ances to artists that fall within the defined categories.332 The fol-
lowing list of categories would correctly balance public benefits in 
artistic expression against the economic function of trademarks.333 
The first category would involve the unauthorized use of a well-
known or culturally relevant trademark. Artists utilizing these 
marks should adhere to the Ninth Circuit’s most recent application 
of the Rogers test.334 The defendant must merely prove that the use 
of the mark is artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading.335 
The relevance threshold should remain substantially low, so judges 
                                                                                                                            
327 VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 3:15–CV–01729–LB, 2015 
WL 5000102 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-15137 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 
2016). 
328 See William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP 
Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L J. 453, 496 (2012) (“[T]rademark . . . 
lawyers and their clients sometimes enforce admittedly weak IP claims precisely because 
it can be an effective strategy with few downsides . . . as enforcement targets frequently 
choose to capitulate or settle rather than resist claims on the legal merits . . . .”). 
329 See Rosenblatt, supra note 317, at 623–24; see also Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on 
Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 858–62 (2012); 
William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 123 (2008). 
330 McGeveran, supra note 311, at 2271. 
331 Id. at 2288–89. Rules would specify infringing conduct in advance, leaving factual 
determinations after the disputed case of infringement. 
332 Id. at 2286–87. 
333 Id. at 2304. 
334 See supra notes 224–43 and accompanying text. 
335 See id. 
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do not have to make a determination concerning a work’s artistic 
value.336 Additionally, only an obvious and unambiguous statement 
of sponsorship would render the work explicitly misleading. Final-
ly, the courts should ignore any semblance of a referential require-
ment, so that defendants are not constrained in creative decisions 
surrounding the mark in question. An important characteristic of 
this suggested approach is the complete removal of a searching in-
quiry for the likelihood of confusion. Rather than wasting precious 
time and money litigating an inconsequential matter, courts should 
first decide any First Amendment defenses at the motion to dis-
miss stage of a trial.337 
This suggestion would clarify the inconsistent decisions within 
the Ninth Circuit. The Seventh and Second Circuits would remove 
the likelihood of confusion analysis from their initial inquiries, lead-
ing to a more equitable position between competing parties that 
have unequal resources.338 Furthermore, removing the referential 
requirement would significantly widen creative freedom by overrul-
ing the artificial restrictions adopted by the Sixth Circuit in 
Parks.339 However, courts should only analyze the popularity of the 
mark itself, not the popularity of the artist utilizing the mark.340 
While there is an obvious risk of obscure artists exploiting a 
                                                                                                                            
336 See Jason K. Levine, Can the Right of Publicity Afford Free Speech? A New Right of 
Publicity Test for First Amendment Cases, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171, 188 (2004) 
(“It is hard to imagine a better way to chill free speech and engender a complete lack of 
reliability in judicial holdings than to let judges determine on motions of law what is or is 
not expressive or creative.”). 
337 This would remedy one of the central weaknesses of the current Rogers test, which 
“allow[s] a sympathetic plaintiff . . . to go forward with her case . . . requiring the court to 
examine and make a determination, whether factual or legal, as to the meaning, and 
indirectly the merits, of the content of an artistic work.” Greggs, supra note 254, at 1290. 
338 See Joshua Beser, Comment, False Endorsement or First Amendment? An Analysis of 
Celebrity and Trademark Rights and Artistic Expression, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1787, 1791 
(2004) (“While major label musicians and their record labels, such as the rap group 
OutKast, LaFace Records, and, ultimately, media giant Bertelsmann, have the resources 
to risk expensive litigation to use a celebrity’s name in a title, the vast majority of 
potential users do not.”). 
339 See supra Section II.C. 
340 But see Beser, supra note 338, at 1825 (“If an artist is popular, he will have less reason 
to use a celebrity’s name or likeness for his own gain, and thus the use is more likely 
artistic in nature. Likewise, an unknown artist using a celebrity’s name will do so to gain 
notoriety for his work, free-riding on the celebrity’s fame.”). 
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brand’s fame, the dangers of unequal treatment among artists far 
outweigh these concerns.341 
The second category of uses would involve unfamiliar marks 
that are relatively new to the market. For these marks, it is impor-
tant for the law to grant a limited window of protection to mark 
holders against artists that may attempt to co-opt marks through 
intentional or unintentional means. Many of the cases within this 
category would involve reverse confusion claims, similar to the Re-
belution decision.342 In order to maintain consistency without ac-
tually implementing the stringent referential requirement, unau-
thorized uses of unfamiliar marks must be artistically relevant, not 
explicitly misleading, and transformative. The relevance and mis-
leading standards would follow the same application as the pre-
vious category. However, the court should treat these uses under 
the more nuanced transformative approach adopted in right of pub-
licity cases.343 Even though the marks in these situations would be 
less established, unfamiliar marks, the marks remain extremely 
vulnerable to confusing uses that undermine the marketplace. The 
content creator will have free reign to use another’s mark in any 
way that satisfies his creative urges, so long as the creator validates 
his use as an original expression.344 While this inquiry would re-
quire judges to engage in a minimal level of artistic judgment,345 
this high barrier grants extra protection to senior mark holders that 
                                                                                                                            
341 Id. (“Whether an artist has already gained notoriety should have no bearing on the 
First Amendment protection he receives.”). 
342 732 F. Supp. 2d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
343 See supra Section I.B.3. 
344 See e.g., Medina v. Dash Films, Inc., No. 15-CV-2551 (KBF), 2016 WL 3906714, *4–
6 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-2848 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 
2016). In Medina, a relatively unknown Latin band “Loisaidas” brought a trademark 
infringement lawsuit against an episodic work created by Kanye West that utilized the 
“Loisaidas” mark. Id. at *1–2. The district court dismissed the claim under the First 
Amendment. Id. at *6. In analyzing artistic relevance, the court inferred that the term was 
slang for Manhattan’s Lower East Side, and the use did not attempt to free ride on the 
band. Id. at *5.  Thus, Kanye validated his use of the unknown mark and was free to use it 
in his artistic work. Id. at *5–6. 
345 However, relying on judges to make these determinations can be problematic. See 
Stewart Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Grp., LLC, No. CV 10–2982 GAF (SSX), 2011 
WL 12877019, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011) (“[C]ourts are ill-equipped to make the 
artistic judgments as to precisely how important the use of a mark is to the message 
conveyed.”). 
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may not have attained the same notoriety of possible celebrity art-
ists, such as Pitbull in Rebelution.346 Still, if the artist proves that the 
use is sufficiently transformative, the court should dismiss the 
claim without engaging in a prolonged analysis of likelihood of con-
fusion. 
Finally, an analysis of the current case law suggests that the 
Rogers test makes significant concessions of trademark ownership 
in the tarnishment realm. In the wake of controversial decisions, 
like Roxbury and Walking Mountain,347 courts should consider a 
new approach to allow mark holders to control the associations of 
their brand with morally questionable material. This Note proposes 
that any use of a registered mark in direct and close accompani-
ment to sex or drugs should receive very limited First Amendment 
protections.348 This framework would preserve the mark’s integrity 
against associations that significantly harm the public perception of 
the mark, but some transformative uses would permit artists to util-
ize a mark for artistic expression. For example, Any Given Sunday 
could have freely utilized real NFL marks even though it tackled 
very adult material, because it reflected the current lifestyle within 
the league.349 Still, even a valid transformative use should bear a 
disclaimer explicitly denouncing any public notion of sponsorship 
by the mark holder. For a transformative film like Any Given Sun-
day, this requirement could demand a title credit that clearly dis-
avows any sense of sponsorship. On the other hand, a “gross and 
revolting sex film” with a purely exploitative intent would not re-
                                                                                                                            
346 See supra notes 208–16 and accompanying text. 
347 See supra notes 195–207 and accompanying text. 
348 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010) (“There 
have been at least eight federal cases in six jurisdictions that conclude that a famous mark 
is tarnished when its mark is semantically associated with a new mark that is used to sell 
sex-related products.”); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 950 
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[G]iven the graphic, sexually explicit nature of the website and the 
illustrations of illegal drug use, the ‘VelVeeda’ mark likely tarnishes Velveeta®.”); 
Jennifer E. Rothman, Symposium, Adult Entertainment: Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual 
Property, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 161 (2012) (“[T]rademark . . . law ha[s] 
disfavored works, marks and uses that depict sex or simply nudity.”). 
349 See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text. 
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ceive any semblance of protections, adopting the remnants of the 
alternative avenues test.350 
CONCLUSION 
This Note’s suggested approach would implement important 
safeguards to avoid lengthy trademark litigation. When a defendant 
in a trademark action pleads valid First Amendment defenses, 
courts must strive to completely avoid any semblance of a likelih-
ood of confusion inquiry. The threshold analysis of artistic relev-
ance and explicit misleadingness will function as a gatekeeper to 
prevent an unnecessary and lengthy factual inquiry. In essence, the 
earlier that judges settle these borderline frivolous claims, the more 
likely that transaction costs and risk of future litigation will de-
crease. Thus, artists will face fewer hurdles in creating content. 
 
                                                                                                                            
350 Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202–03 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
